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Pybas: Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation Commission:

NOTES AND COMMENTS
NORTHWEST CENTRAL PIPELINE
CORP. v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION:
THE SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS STATE
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE

NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the beginning of the oil and gas industry, the rule of capture was
supreme to any notions of conservation.' In an effort to produce as
much as possible as fast as possible, little, if any, thought was given to
conservation. 2 As a result of the ensuing waste stemming from the rule
of capture,3 the oil and gas producing states began enacting legislation
designed to prevent such waste.4 The aim of the statutes was to protect
correlative rights of landowners5 and to prevent waste of valuable natural
resources.' Predictably, the United States Supreme Court soon had occasion
to examine the legality of such statutes. In Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,7 a case decided in 1900, the Court upheld an Indiana regulation
1. Motion of Interstate Oil Compact Commission (IOCC) for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 3, Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 109 S.
Ct. 1262 (1989) (No. 86-1856). It is a long settled principle of property law that a landowner has the
right to the oil and gas below the landowner's property. This is so even if the production results in
drainage from an adjacent property. Id.
2. Id.
3. Waste results when a landowner's property is being drained by a neighboring well, and that
landowner, to protect his or her interest, drills a well to produce before all that is under the landowner's surface is drained away. A rush to produce results in more wells being drilled than are
necessary for the efficient production of the reservoir. Reservoir energy is prematurely depleted,
resulting in oil or gas being left in the reservoir that could have been produced had prudent methods
of production been used. Martin, Regulation of Gas ProductionRates andImbalances After Transco
v. Oil and Gas Board, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 298, 300-01 (1988).
4. Brief for the IOCC, supranote 1, at 3. These conservation laws regulate the production of a
field along sensible conservation principles and are intended to facilitate efficient and prudent production of oil and gas from a common pool. Id.
5. Martin, supra note 3, at 301. The principle of correlative rights is concerned with allowing
a mineral owner the opportunity to produce all the oil or gas that he or she "owns", before it can be
drained away. See supra note 3, at 326 n.102 for the Kansas Corporation Commission definition of
correlative rights.
6. Brief for the IOCC, supra note 1, at 3.
7. 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
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aimed at protecting correlative rights of property owners against a claim
that such a regulation amounted to a taking of private property.
The natural gas industry, in addition to being subject to regulations
of the various gas producing states, became subject to dual authority in
1938, when Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 9 and under
additional regulation in 1978, when Congress enacted the Natural Gas

Policy Act (NGPA).1 Since the creation of the dual regulatory scheme,
the Supreme Court has labored to define the line between state and fed-

eral authority." One particular aspect of the dual scheme, which the
Court has struggled with clarifying, is whether state power to regulate
natural gas rates of production and takes is preempted by federal law.t2
8. Id. at 196. The challenged regulation involved a prohibition against venting gas, which the
defendant company was doing in order to produce oil. This procedure, however, was reducing the
back pressure required to keep salt water from invading a stratum that provided gas to nearby cities.
Id. The defendant claimed that the regulation amounted to a taking of private property, for without
venting the gas, it would not be able to produce the oil belonging to it. Id. at 198-99. See also
Martin, supra note 3, at 299-300 (discussing the Supreme Court's response to early challenges to
state conservation efforts).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 717-717w (1976). The NGA was enacted after the federal government had
determined that the monopoly power then exercised by interstate pipelines was detrimental to distributors, consumers, and societal welfare. Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 65 (1982). Federal action was deemed necessary because the United
States Supreme Court, using commerce clause analysis, had invalidated state attempts to regulate
interstate pipelines. Id. (citing Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229
(1911)).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 3301-3432 (1985). The NGPA was enacted in response to severe gas shortages
caused by artificial price schemes imposed by the NGA. Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp. v. State
Oil and Gas Board, 474 U.S. 409, 431-32 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The NGPA's purpose
was to deregulate the price of natural gas sold to interstate pipelines, allowing free-market conditions
to balance the supply, demand and prices of natural gas. Id. Consequently, natural gas was divided
into three categories: high-cost gas, new gas, and old gas. Id. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 86-89;
Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title I, 59 TEx. L. REV. 101 (1980).
11. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) (whether sales of natural gas
by an independent producer to interstate pipeline companies which transport and resell the gas in
interstate commerce are subject to federal regulation under the NGA); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 (1947) (whether the Federal Power Commission had jurisdiction to regulate sales made in the field by petitioner to interstate pipeline companies); Colorado
Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581 (1945) (whether the FPC, in fixing
petitioner's interstate wholesales rates, could consider the petitioner's gas wells and gas gathering
facilities, which were beyond federal regulation, with all its transportion and distribution facilities,
which were subject to federal regulation); Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co,,
314 U.S. 498 (1942) (at issue was whether Illinois could require a gas company who supplied the
intrastate market with gas it received from interstate sources to extend its instate facilities, or
whether such a requirement was subject to federal jurisdiction). The aforementioned cases were all
decided in favor of federal jurisdiction.
12. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963) (hereinafter
Northern Natural) infra text and accompanying notes 45-63; Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409 (1986) (hereinafter Transco) infra text and accompanying notes
64-113.
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Northwest CentralPipeline Corp. v. State CorporationCommission, 13 concerned whether a regulation adopted by the State Corporation Commission of Kansas (KCC), designed to prevent waste and to protect
correlative rights in gas by encouraging that gas quotas be timely produced, was preempted by federal law or violated the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution.1 4 In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that the
KCC order was not preempted by federal law nor violative of the Commerce Clause. 5 Thus it appears that the Court, after having stirred fears
that it would strike any conservation measure that might impact
purchasing decisions, 6 has at least allayed that fear as it relates to the
regulation of natural gas producers.
II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Facts

The origins of the controversy in Northwest Central date back to
1944, when the KCC adopted the Basic Proration Order for the Hugoton
17
Field after finding that correlative rights violations were commonplace.
The Hugoton Field is a vast oil and gas field with portions located in
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.'" Several interstate1 9 and intrastate pipelines take gas from thousands of gas wells in the Kansas portion of the
field alone.20 The Basic Proration Order established an allowable
formula permitting a developed lease the opportunity to produce roughly
the amount of gas underlying the lease.2" The Basic Proration Order also
established production tolerances, set forth in paragraph (p),22 to allow
13. 109 S. Ct. 1262 (1989) (hereinafter Northwest Central)infra text accompanying notes 17-44
and 114-153. Effective January 1, 1987, Northwest Central Pipeline Corporation changed its name
to Williams Natural Gas Company. In order to avoid confusion, however, the name Northwest
Central is used throughout this note.
14. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1267.
15. Id.
16. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963), infra text accompanying notes 45-63.
17. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1268.
18. Martin, supra note 3, at 325.
19. Brief for the Appellant at 8 n.8, Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n,
109 S.Ct. 1262 (1989) (No. 86-1856). The other four interstate pipelines are: (1) Colorado Interstate
Gas Company; (2) Northern Natural Gas Company; (3) Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company;
and (4) KN Energy, Inc. Id.
20. Martin, supra note 3, at 325.
21. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1268. An "allowable" is the well production quota. The
quotas at play here were based on market demand, well spacing, and deliverability. Id.
22. Prior to its amendment in 1983, paragraph (p) provided:
(1) any well must be 'shut-in' if the well has overproduced its allowable by a cumulative
amount equal to six times its allowable for the month of January; (2) if any well fell short
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for under-and-over-production resulting from market fluctuations.23

Pursuant to paragraph (p), once underages equaled several times the
monthly allowable, they were cancelled. 24 Yet, because the cancellation
could easily be overcome by simply applying to have the underages reinstated, there was no incentive to take the underages at any time.2 5
As a result of the vast amounts of underages being stockpiled, the
KCC, upon investigation, amended paragraph (p) in February, 1983.26
Expert testimony during the KCC investigation indicated that the lack of
uniform production was severely harming the correlative rights of producers in the field. 27 During the investigation the KCC concluded that as
of producing its allowable by a cumulative amount equal to six times the prior January
allowable, this shortfall would be cancelled and the producer required to apply to the commission to reinstate the cancelled underage before later making up the shortage; and (3)
cancelled underages will be reinstated upon a 'showing that the wells are in an overproduced status; that the purchaser is willing and able to take the amount of gas; and that the
length of time proposed by applicant for the production of the amounts of gas to be reinstated is reasonable under the circumstances.'
Brief for the Appellee, at 4 n.1, Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 109 S. Ct.
1262 (1989) (No. 86-1856).
23. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1269.
24. Id. at 1269.
25. Id.
26. Brief for the Appellee, at 4-10, Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1269. As of September 1,
1982, uncancelled underages totalled 204 billion cubic feet and cancelled and unreinstated underages
totalled 314 billion cubic feet. Id. For comparison, the Hugoton Field produced 268 billion cubic
feet of gas in 1986. Martin, supra note 3, at 326 n.101 (citing the Oil and Gas Journal). It is
noteworthy that because paragraph (p) allowed for cancelled underages to be readily reinstated,
interstate purchasers were deliberately using the Kansas Hugoton Field for storage. Northwest Central, 109 S.Ct. at 1270. This was due to the fact that following the enactment of the NGPA, many
pipelines entered long-term take-or-pay contracts to purchase the higher-priced deregulated gas. Id.
The KCC was also interested in stopping the drainage that was occurring as the natural gas moved
from areas of shut-in well to open, producing wells. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 22, at 11.
Drainage results in waste of natural gas due to dissipation as the gas moves through the reservoir
rock. Id.
27. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 22, at 10. Drainage can violate the correlative rights of
producers that regularly operate their wells as well as producers of shut-in wells. Id. at 11. The
following examples, given during hearings conducted pursuant to the KCC's investigation, illustrate
both types of correlative rights violations:
(1) pipeline (P) contract[s to purchase gas from producer (A) and producer (B). The
market demand is 100 BCF. A and B have equal deliverability capability of (X), and each
have 640 acres attributed to their respective wells. When these factors are computed
through the Commission's allowable formula, the wells are assigned the same allowable.
During period one, producer A is shut-in to the extent that he accumulates excess underage which is cancelled. During the same period, producer B produces his entire allowable.
Over the next two periods of production, A is shut-in completely while B continues to
produce. By this time, B, who has been producing all along, has a deliverability of less
than (X) due to decreasing shut-in pressure. Therefore, B is assigned a lower allowable
than A. Meanwhile, A continues to have underage cancelled at a rate equal to or higher
than the original allowable, because, over time, his shut-in pressure has risen. This continues for many periods as B's allowable is gradually reduced and A continues to receive an
increasing allowable assignment, which is cancelled every period. For all practical purposes, A is banking his underages to be spent later. After many periods, A will reinstate

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss2/3

4

Pybas: Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation Commission:
1989]

NORTHWEST CENTRAL

paragraph (p) then existed, it was likely that the accumulated underages
would be drained away and would never be produced.2 8 Thus, paragraph (p) was amended to permanently cancel underages unless the underages are reinstated and produced within a specific time period.2 9 The
purpose was to motivate the timely production of natural gas in order to
provide greater protection of correlative rights.3"
B.

Issue

Northwest Central Pipeline challenged the amended paragraph arguing that because it impacted interstate pipelines' purchasing practices,
the new paragraph (p) was preempted by the NGA. 1 The argument was
founded on Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State CorporationCommission,3 2
where the court stated that the NGA precluded any state regulation that
and produce this cancelled underage. If the pipeline then decides to take a lot of gas, A
may reinstate and produce all of its backlog of cancelled underage in a short period of time.
In this event, B, who will be producing less at a lower allowable, may have its gas drained
away to fulfill A's greater demand upon the resirvoir. Over a stretch of ten periods, A will
have accumulated an allowable of at least ten times the original allowable. B will have
been assigned a gradually reduced allowable of the same ten periods. If, in the tenth period, A reinstates and produces all its backlog, A will have produced much more gas than
B, and possibly at B's expense. (2)[Here] the shut-in producer (A) is surrounded by producing wells which are draining gas from under A's acreage. A will be accumulating cancelled underage which may, of course, be reinstated and produced at a later date. Unless
the drainage from the shut-in wells is stopped, A may be unable to produce his entire
underage by the end of the field's life. Therefore, A may never recover his share of
reserves.
Id. at 11-12.
28. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1270.
29. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 22, at 5 n.3. The amendment provides:
(1) underages cancelled before 1975 could be reinstated only if reinstatement had been
requested by the end of 1983; (2) underages cancelled from January 1, 1975, through December 31, 1982, could only be reinstated if reinstatement was requested by December 31,
1985, and only if the well was in an overproduced status at the time of the request; and (3)
underages cancelled after December 31, 1982, could only be reinstated within three years
of the cancellation and only if the well was in an overproduced status at the time of the
request.
Id. at 5.
30. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1271.
31. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1272.
32. 372 U.S. 84 (1963). In Northern Natural, the Supreme Court invalidated an order of the
Kansas Corporation Commission requiring an interstate pipeline purchaser to take ratably from all
wells supplying it with gas from a common gas pool. Id. The Court found that the order did not fall
within the state regulated "production or gathering" exemption of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b),
thus it was preempted by the NGA. Id. at 89-90. The Court went on to say that "[t]he federal
regulatory scheme leaves no room either for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales of gas... or for state regulations which would indirectly achieve the same result." Id. at 91.
See infra text and accompanying notes 45-63.
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could affect, either directly or indirectly, pipelines' purchasing decisions. 3 The pipeline also argued that paragraph (p) encroached on ex-

clusive federal control over the abandonment of natural gas supplies
committed to interstate markets.3 a The pipeline's final argument was
based on the belief that because the amendment would force interstate

pipelines to take more gas from Kansas, other producing states' share of
the interstate market would decrease, thereby violating the Commerce
Clause.35

C.

The Kansas Supreme Court's Opinion
In May, 1985, the Kansas Supreme Court36 distinguished Northern

Natural37 and affirmed the District Court of Grey County, holding that

the regulation was valid because it was controlled by § l(b) of the
NGA,3 8 which gives to the states regulatory power over the production
and gathering of natural gas.3 9 On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court vacated and remanded' the decision to the Kansas Supreme
Court for further review in light of the Court's decision in Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Board.4 1
On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court again affirmed the KCC or-

der,42 holding that whereas the regulation at issue in Transco was aimed
at purchasers, the KCC order was aimed at producers.4 3 It further held
33. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1272.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1267.
36. Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 237 Kan. 248, 699 P.2d 1002
(1985).
37. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1272-73.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976) reads:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public
consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas
companies engaged in such transportion or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities
used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
39. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1272-73.
40. Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1002 (1986).
41. 474 U.S. 409 (1986). The regulation at issue in Transco was essentially identical to the
Kansas order that had been struck down in Northern Natural. The Mississippi Supreme Court,
however, had ruled that the enactment of the NGPA effectively nullified Northern Natural. The
United States Supreme Court disagreed. It overturned the Mississippi decision, declaring that the
characteristics of the federal regulatory scheme that provided the preemption framework in Northern
Naturalhad not been altered by the NGPA. See infra text and accompanying notes 64-113.
42. Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 240 Kan. 638, 732 P.2d 775
(1987).
43. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1273.
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that any effect paragraph (p) had on interstate sales was merely incidental rather than the goal of the regulation.'
III.
A.

LAW OF RATABLE TAKE REGULATIONS PRIOR
TO NORTHWEST CENTRAL

The Northern Natural Case

It is somewhat fitting that the Hugoton Field is the focus of the
regulation at issue in Northwest Central,for it was the Supreme Court's
ruling in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State CorporationCommission,4 5 a
case involving a KCC ratable take regulation in the Hugoton Field, to
which all ratable take orders since have been measured.
At issue then was a 1959 KCC order requiring Northern Natural
Gas Co. (Northern), an interstate pipeline company, to purchase ratably
from all wells to which it was connected in the Hugoton Field.4 6 The
pipeline, however, was operating under only approximately 125 purchase
contracts. 47 The oldest of these contracts was with Republic Natural
Gas Company, a contract under which Northern was required to
purchase all the gas that Republic's wells could produce.4 8 Because
Northern's contracts with other producers were conditioned upon the
Republic contract, Northern had only to take from those other producers
that portion of gas needed beyond that supplied by Republic.49
The 1958 ratable take order came about because Northern's
purchases that year were much lower than the allowables for the wells
from which it was taking gas." However, because of the Republic contract calling for Northern to purchase all the gas Republic was allowed
44. Id.

45. 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
46. Northern Natural,372 U.S. at 85-86. In 1960, this order was superseded by a general order
directed at all natural gas purchasers, which read:
In each common source of supply under proration by this Commission, each purchaser
shall take gas in proportion to the allowables from all the wells to which it is connected and
shall maintain all such wells in substantially the same proportionate status as to overproduction or underproduction; provided, however, this rule shall not apply when a difference
in proportionate status results from the inability of a well to produce proportionately with
other wells connected to the purchaser.
Id. at 86 n.1. To take ratably means that purchases must be in such quantities that each owner will
be able to recover a fair share of the oil and gas originally in place beneath the owner's land. See H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 802 (7th ed. 1987).
47. Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 86.
48. Id. at 87.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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to produce, it was the producers with the contracts subordinate to Republic's that suffered the drop in production."1 The order required
Northern to take gas ratably from all wells, that is, to take gas in proportion to well allowables, with the intent being to correct the field's
imbalance."
Consequently, Northern sought judicial relief on the premise that
the NGA preempted the order because it sought to regulate "the sale and
transportion of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale."5 3 The
Kansas Supreme Court upheld the order based on its belief that the order
did not affect interstate commerce or regulate the price of gas.5 The
United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-three decision, reversed the
Kansas Supreme Court and held that the NGA had conferred upon the
Federal Power Commission exclusive jurisdiction over the transportation
and sales of natural gas committed to interstate markets, and that since
the KCC orders could not be considered to be within the "production
56
and gathering" exemption,5 5 the orders were therefore preempted.
In broad and potentially far-reaching language, the Court said that
"[t]he federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either for direct state
regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales of natural gas, 57 or for
state regulations which would indirectly achieve the same result." 58 The
Court then found the order preempted because it intruded into the area
of regulation that had been granted to the Federal Power Commission. 9
The orders, the Court said, impermissibly burdened interstate pipelines,
rather than the KCC, with the responsibility of "balancing the output of
thousands of natural gas wells within the state. ' 60 Also, "any readjustment of purchasing patterns which such orders might require of purchasers who previously took unratably, could seriously impair the Federal
51. Id. at 88.
52. Id. at 88-89.
53. Northern Natural,372 U.S. at 89.

54. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 188 Kan. 351, 362 P.2d 599 (1961),
reh'g denied, 188 Kan. 624, 364 P.2d 668 (1961).
55. See supra note 38.

56. Northern Natural,372 U.S. at 91. The Court stated: "Congress enacted a comprehensive
scheme of federal regulation of 'all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce, whether by a
pipeline company or not and whether occurring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate
pipeline company.'" Id. at 91 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682
(1954)).
57. Id. at 91 (citing Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Pinoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955)).
58. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 91-92.
60. Id. at 92. This statement has been characterized as "mystifying ...since the Court was
apparently taking away the principal mechanism for balancing output and since it was leaving it to
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Commission's authority to regulate the intricate relationship between the
purchasers' cost structures and eventual costs to wholesale customers
who sell to consumers in other States.", 6 1 Although the Court conceded
that it was possible that the state order might not interfere with the federal scheme,6 2 it went on to say, "there lurks such imminent possibility of
collision in orders purposely directed at interstate wholesale purchasers
that the orders must be declared a nullity in order to assure the effectuation of the comprehensive federal regulation ordained by Congress. "63
B.

The Transco Case

The second critical case in the unfolding of the Northwest Central
decision is Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas
Board.64 The United States Supreme Court, by a five-to-four decision,
invalidated a Mississippi regulation that compelled Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line (Transco) to take ratably from all owners of a common pool,
irrespective of whether the pipeline had a contract with each owner.6 5
Transco, relying on Northern Natural, argued that the order was preempted by the NGA.66 However, the Mississippi Supreme Court held
that Northern Natural was no longer applicable, for it was the Court's
jurisdicbelief that the Natural Gas Policy Act of 197867 had transferred
68
tion of wellhead purchases from federal to state authority.

The Transco problem originated in the Harper Sand gas pool in
Marion County, Mississippi, which at the time the regulation was challenged had only six producing wells.6 9 Transco operated an interstate
natural gas pipeline that took gas from fields in Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas.7 ° Some of the interest owners in the Harper gas, such as
Getty Oil Co. (Getty), actually operated the wells, while others, such as
Coastal Exploration (Coastal), only owned a smaller working interest in
the pipeline to control its takes contract by contract, well by well, balance or no balance. The Court
was shifting the authority for controlling wells from the state to the pipelines, with the pipelines
having no one's interest except their own to account to in this management." Martin, supra note 3,
at 315 n.57.
61. Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 92.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
65. Id. at 409-10.
66. Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 3301-3432 (1985).
68. Transco, 474 U.S. at 411.
69. Id. Because Harper gas is produced from below 15,000 feet, it is classified under the
NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3317(c)(1) as "high-cost natural gas." Id.
70. Transco, 474 U.S. at 412.
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the different wells.7 1 In the late 1970's, Transco entered into numerous
contracts7 2 for Harper gas. 73 Transco's contracts with Getty called for
Transco to take only Getty's gas, while Transco's contracts with another
operator, Florida Exploration, obligated Transco to take all of a well's
production regardless of whether all the production was under contract.74 Gas demand was such that Transco also purchased Coastal's and
other small interest owner's production shares in the Getty wells, even
though there was no contract between the smaller interest owners and
Transco.75
In 1982, however, as the nation-wide natural gas supply began to
exceed demand, Transco was suddenly faced with taking more gas than it
could sell. 76 As a result, in May 1982, Transco ceased buying gas from
owners with whom it had not contracted.7 7 Unexpectedly confronted
with no buyer for its gas, Coastal asked for, but was denied, Transco's
authorization to ratify the Getty contract.7 8 Transco did, however, offer
to buy Costal's gas for less than the contract price for which it was taking
Getty's gas.7 9 Coastal refused this offer." Subsequently, Getty reduced
its production to equal the amount of its ownership interest in its wells. 81
Although Getty's cut back resulted in depriving Coastal of income
because none of its Harper gas was being produced, the more momentous
82
effect of the reduction was that it was causing drainage of Coastal's gas.
Coastal understandably cried foul in that Getty's cut back resulted in gas
draining from Getty's area of the field (where Coastal's ownership interests were located) to the Florida Exploration wells, which were still producing at near full production. 3
In July, 1982, as a result of Coastal being deprived of its share of the
71. Id.
72. Transco's contracts contained take-or-pay provisions which generally require the purchaser
to pay for a minimum percentage of gas even if the purchaser takes no gas. Take-or-pay provisions
generally provide sellers with a steady income stream, and facilitate prudent development. Id. See
Pierce, supra note 9, at 77-79.
73. Transco, 474 U.S. at 412.
74. Id. at 412-13.
75. Id. at 413.
76. Id.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Recall that field imbalances lead to correlative rights violations and waste as the gas
migrates from areas of high pressure (shut-in or reduced production) to areas of low pressure (producing wells). See supra note 27.
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gas produced from the Harper Sand, Coastal asked the State Oil and Gas
Board of Mississippi to enforce its ratable take regulation.8" Following
an investigative hearing, Transco was found in violation of the regulation
and was ordered, if it was to take gas at all, to take gas ratably from all
owners in the Harper Sand poolY
Transco appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District
of Hinds County, Mississippi, arguing that the ratable take order was
preempted by the NGA and the NGPA,8 6 and that the order violated the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.8 7 The circuit court
affirmed the ratable take order and Transco subsequently appealed to the
Supreme Court of Mississippi.8 8
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in upholding the circuit court,
ruled that were it not for the enactment of the NGPA, the Mississippi
order would assuredly be preempted just as the Kansas order in Northern
Natural8 9 was preempted. 90 The court, however, reasoned that the
NGA had been superseded by the NGPA, whereby regulatory authority
of wellhead sales of "high-cost" gas was now entrusted to each producing
state. 9 1 In addition, the court concluded that the NGA and the FERC's
jurisdiction under it never applied to deregulated gas.92 Consequently,
Transco's preemption argument was precluded. 93 Transco's Commerce
Clause argument, that the order violated the Commerce Clause because
compliance with it would impermissibly burden interstate commerce,
was likewise rejected. 94 The court, utilizing the balancing test enunciated
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,95 held that the legitimate local interest of
the order, protecting correlative rights and preventing waste, outweighed
84. Transco, 474 U.S. at 414. The regulation, Statewide Rule 48, provided: "Each person now
or hereafter engaged in the business of purchasing oil or gas from owners, operators, or producers
shall purchase without discrimination in favor of one owner, operator, or producer against another
in the same common source of supply." Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
87. Transco, 474 U.S. at 414-15.
88. Id. at 415.
89. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
90. Transco, 474 U.S. at 415. See also Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and
Gas Bd., 457 So. 2d 1298 (Miss. 1984) rev'd 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
91. Transco, 474 U.S. at 415 (citing 457 So. 2d at 1316). See supra note 69.
92. Id. (quoting 457 So. 2d at 1316).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 416-17 (citing 457 So. 2d at 1318-21).
95. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). "[WMhen a state law 'regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.'" Transco, 474 U.S. at 416 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
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96
its incidental effect on interstate commerce.
The United States Supreme Court, like the Mississippi Supreme
Court, recognized that the order's validity depended upon whether the
NGPA altered the federal regulatory scheme enough to avoid the same
result as Northern Natural.97 The Court commented that the Northern
Natural decision was based on preserving the federal regulatory role and
on protecting consumers by ensuring the availability of less costly natural
gas. 98 Furthermore, the FPC was then also authorized to control artificially natural gas prices from the producer to the customer. 99 However,
in the early 1970's, Congress, upon realizing that the federal regulatory
scheme was contributing to natural gas shortages and related problems,
enacted the NGPA.1°
The Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board argued that producing
states were granted regulatory authority over high-cost natural gas by
virtue of the NGPA's having removed such authority from the FERC.t10
The Supreme Court, while conceding that the FERC lacked authority to
regulate pipeline purchases of high-cost gas, reasoned that the ratable
take order frustrated the ability of market forces to set the supply, demand, and price of high-cost gas.102 The Court further stated that the
precise question at issue was whether Congress, in removing from the
FERC the authority to regulate the price at which pipelines purchase
high-cost gas, gave such authority to the states.' 0 3 The Court held that
Congress had no such intention and, therefore, the order was preempted
by the NGPA 1°4
The Court also invalidated the ratable take order on grounds that it
was preempted by the NGA as well.' 5 This was because the Court believed that the order would increase the cost of natural gas paid by consumers,' 0 6 and because it disrupted the uniform federal scheme 10 7 by
96. Transco, 474 U.S. at 416.
97. Id. at 417. See supra text and accompanying notes 45-63.
98. Transco, 474 U.S. at 420.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 421. The Gas Board's argument was premised on 15 U.S.C. § 3431(a)(1)(B), which
states: "'the provisions of [the NGA] and the jurisdiction of the Commission under such Act shall
not apply solely by reason of any first sale' of high-cost or new natural gas." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C.

§ 3431(a)(1)(B) (1982)).
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 422.
Id.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 423.
Id. The Court believed that a price increase would result because the order would force
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virtue of the fact that interstate pipelines would have to conform their
conduct to the whims of each producing state.10 8 Lastly, because the
Court concluded that the order was preempted by the NGA and the
NGPA, it did not address Transco's Commerce Clause argument.' 0 9
Justice Rehnquist, 110 writing for the dissent, argued that because the
NGPA removed the wellhead sales of high-cost gas from the coverage of
the NGA, Northern Natural was not controlling; the order therefore did
not conflict with the NGA." t He further stated that the issue was more
properly whether the order hindered the fulfillment of the NGPA's
goal.' 12 The dissent stated that the order enhanced the NGPA in that it
"merely define[d] property rights [and] establish[ed] contractual

rules."' 13
IV.

THE NORTHWEST CENTRAL DECISION

In a unanimous decision, 114 the Supreme Court rejected Northwest
Central's contentions that the KCC order ran afoul of the NGA and the
NGPA, and that it was preempted by the Supremacy Clause. The Court
further held that the order did not violate the Commerce Clause.
The Court first refuted the argument that the proration order was
preempted by the NGA and the NGPA. 115 In doing so, the Court commented that it was a settled principle that states had the authority to
promulgate conservation measures to the extent that Congress had not
occupied the field." 6 While the Court also noted that the NGA gave
federal authorities sole regulatory power over interstate sales and
purchases of natural gas,1 ' it nonetheless reserved to the states authority
over the production and gathering of natural gas."" It went on to add
that the terms "production and gathering" have been deemed to include
Transco to purchase noncontract gas in the Harper Sand pool, forcing cutbacks in takes elsewhere
resulting in take-or-pay clauses in those contracts being activated. Id.
107. Remarkably, the Court did not identify what the uniform federal scheme was. See also
Martin, supra note 3, at 321.
108. Transco, 474 U.S. at 423.
109. Id. at 425.
110. Now Chief Justice Rehnquist.
111. Transco, 474 U.S. at 429 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 432.
113. Id. at 432-33.
114. Northwest Central, 109 S.Ct. 1262.
115. Id. at 1273.
116. Id. at 1274.
117. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976).
118. Northwest Central, 109 S.Ct. at 1274.
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the power to set allowables. 119
The Supreme Court, just as the Kansas Supreme Court had done,
distinguished both Northern Natural and Transco on the grounds that
the regulations involved in those cases were directed at purchasers rather
than producers.12 0 In Northwest Central, however, the order was directed at producers and thus clearly fell within the sphere of regulation
explicitly reserved to the states. 121 It was reasoned that the NGA's reservation to the states of authority over production would effectively be
abolished if the KCC order was preempted because of its effect on purchasers.1 22 The Court stated: "there can be little if any regulation of
production that might not have at least an incremental effect on the costs
1 23
of purchasers in some market and contractual situations. 1
The Court likewise refused to preempt the order simply because
some conflict existed between it and the federal scheme regulating interstate pipeline's costs.1 24 It was noted that although the regulatory authority is split between state and federal authorities, the subjects of the
regulations function in an interrelated manner.1 25 Consequently, it was
unrealistic to presume that confilicts would not occur, and when they
did, that the federal scheme would always prevail. 126 This is especially
so, where, as here, production is simply a reflection of purchasing decisions. 127 The Court thus found that preemption does not follow simply
because Kansas's production regulation affected activities of interstate
128
pipelines.

In spite of the existence of a dual regulatory scheme, state regulation
of production that is merely a veiled attempt to impact purchasing decisions is nonetheless prohibited. 129 Consequently, the Court pronounced
a means-end analysis whereby it held that the KCC proration order was
30

a reasonable means intended to effect a legitimate conservation goal.1

119. d.
120. Id. at 1276.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. This statement is especially significant in that the Transco court had suggested that it
would strike any state regulation that had the potential to impact the purchasing decisions of interstate pipelines. Transco 474 U.S. at 422.
124. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1276.
125. Id. (citing FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 488 (1950)).
126. Id. (citing Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 (1986)).
127. Ard.
128. Id. at 1277.
129. Id. at 1278.
130. Consequently, the following test was given: "[w]here state law impacts on matters within
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Northwest Central's last preemption argument centered on the fact
that, under the NGA, producers are required to continue providing gas
131
in the interstate market until the FERC permits abandonment.
Northwest Central claimed that if underages were cancelled, underproduced parties would essentially be forced to abandon reserves dedicated to interstate commerce. Northwest Central also felt that the order
hindered the purpose of having an abandonment authorized by the
FERC.' 32 The Court found the reasoning unpersuasive in that once the
underages were cancelled, the right to produce that gas no longer existed,
therefore, it could not be characterized as abandonment.' 3 3 Furthermore, because this right was terminated if the production did not occur
in a timely manner, the FERC abandonment requirements simply did
not apply.13 4 The Court, in rejecting the claim that the KCC order
would thwart the purpose of the abandonment requirements, noted that
abanthe aim of the KCC order was in line with the goal of the federal
131
gas.
of
supply
dependable
a
maintain
to
donment provision:
Lastly, Northwest Central's argument that the KCC order violated
Clause because Kansas was effectively forcing interstate
Commerce
the
pipelines to purchase more gas from the Hugoton Field at the expense of
other producing states or, alternatively, because it failed the balancing
test enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,136 also failed to persuade
the Court.

137

FERC's control, the State's purpose must be to regulate production or other subjects of state jurisdiction, and the means chosen must at least plausibly be related to matters of legitimate state concern." Id.
131. Id. at 1279. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976) reads:
No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the
jurisdiction of the [FERC], or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the
permission and approval of the [FERC] first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a
finding by the [FERC] that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that
the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience
or necessity permit such abandonment.
Id. at 1279 n.17.
132. Id. at 1279-80. The purpose of requiring FERC's authorization of an abandonment is "to
assure the public a reliable supply of gas." Id. (quoting United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442
U.S. 529, 536 (1979)).
133. Id. at 1279.
134. Id. at 1279-80.
135. Id. at 1280.
136. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). See supra note 95.
137. Northwest Central, 109 S.Ct. at 1280-82.
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The Court found that the order was valid on its face in that it applied equally to producers selling to intrastate and interstate purchasers. 1 38 This was so because the order was designed, "to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest" and because "its effects on interstate
commerce [were] only incidental" without excessively burdening such
commerce "in relation to the putative local 139
benefits"; it passed the scrutest.
Inc.
Church,
Bruce
v.
Pike
tiny of the
V.

ANALYSIS

The Northwest Centralopinion undeniably is a significant victory for
states in their battle to protect property rights. Because it is an especially
lucid opinion, one is even tempted to conclude that it is the final word on
the legality of such conservation measures. Such a conclusion, however,
is premature in that the Court has addressed the
issues presented in
140
ways.
of
narrow
most
the
in
Central
Northwest
The Northwest Central decision is correct in that the KCC order
clearly fell within the area allowing for state regulation. Had the Court
not upheld the order, the ability of the states to protect correlative rights
and prevent waste would be seriously impaired. This portion of the note
will examine the Court's analysis and suggest perhaps a more appropriate method for determining preemption. In addition, the analysis will
also examine recent proposals for evaluating conservation regulations
under the NGA.
A.

Retreatfrom the "Any-Regulation-that-Might-Impact-PurchasingDecision-is-Preempted'Rationale

The most significant aspect of the decision, undoubtedly to the relief
of the states, is that the Court appears to have abandoned the narrow,
one dimensional analysis it used in deciding Northern Natural and
Transco. 4 ' In both Northern Natural and Transco, the Court had suggested that it would strike any state regulation, irrespective of whether it
was a conservation measure or not, that had the potential to impact the
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1282 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
140. That is, the Court, rather than taking into consideration the reality that the production and
purchasing of natural gas are essentially inseparable physical acts, views production and purchasing
as separate and distinct. See infra text accompanying notes 150-56.
141. It is critical to remember that the regulations at issue in Northern Natural and Transco were
directed at "purchasers", rather than "producers." See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text
and notes 64-113 and accompanying text.
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purchasing decisions of interstate pipelines.14 2 Here, the Court at last
recognized that it was impossible for a state to protect correlative rights
by means of a production regulation without its having some impact on
the purchasing decisions of interstate pipelines.14 3 This point was, of
course, emphasized in the dissenting opinion of Northern Natural.1"
In Northwest Central,the court altered its preemption analysis, from
that in Northern and Transco, through its treatment of the NGA.145 In
these prior cases, the majority opinions of the Court viewed the NGA as
demarcating the boundary between federal and state jurisdiction with a
precision and tidiness that simply does not exist. 14 6 In contrast, the
Northwest Central decision recognizes the reality that federal and state
regulatory bodies will occasionally conflict; yet it also recognizes that
such tensions do not always give rise to preemption. 147
Also important to the Northwest Central opinion is the disappearance of the "uniform federal scheme" that inexplicably appeared in
Transco. The Transco majority found the Mississippi order "disturbs the
uniformity of the federal scheme, since interstate pipelines will be forced
to comply with varied state regulations of their purchasing practices." 148
Commentators have admitted being mystified as to what federal scheme
the majority is referring. 4 9 This reasoning, however, carried to its logical extent would mean that any state regulation affecting interstate pipelines' purchasing practices, irrespective of its nature or aim, would be
preempted unless it was identical to the regulations of all other states,
which in turn would have to be identical to the federal scheme. If not, an
interstate pipeline would be forced to comply with varied state regulations, a compliance which according to the Transco majority is unlawful.
142. "The federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either for direct state regulation of the
prices of interstate wholesales of natural gas [citation omitted], or for state regulations which would
indirectly achieve the same result." Northern Natural,372 U.S. at 91. "To the extent that Congress
denied FERC the power to regulate affirmatively particular aspects of the first sale of gas, it did so
because it wanted to leave determination of supply and first-sale price to the market." Transco, 474
U.S. at 422.
143. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1276. "It is inevitable that 'jurisdictional tensions [will]
arise as a result of the fact that [state and federally regulated elements coexist within] a single integrated system, [citation omitted]" Id.
144. Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 103 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145. It is, of course, vital to recall that the NGPA was also at issue in Transco.
146. Recall that in Northern Natural the majority found the boundary line to be so clear that it
preempted the regulation upon only a finding of a "prospect of interference". Northern Natural,372
U.S. at 92.
147. Northwest Central, 109 S.Ct. at 1276.
148. Transco, 474 U.S. at 423.
149. See Martin, supra note 3, at 321-22, for a particularly stinging critique.
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Fortunately, this reasoning was not applied in Northwest Central,for, as
demonstrated, the KCC order would also have been found to be
preempted.
B.

Production v. Purchasing

Although Northwest Central was decided correctly, that the Court
continues to use the "production v. purchasing" test as its primary criteria in deciding such cases is troubling. It is odd and overly formalistic
that a conservation measure aimed at producers is valid, while the same
regulation, with the same purposes and effects, is invalid if it is directed
at purchasers (interstate pipelines).
Examining a regulation only in terms of whether it is directed at
producers or purchasers demonstrates a failure to fully understand the
nature of natural gas production. Because natural gas cannot be stored
at the surface in large quantities, as oil can be, its production and movement into interstate commerce is essentially "one and the same physical
operation."' 5 ° Thus, an order regulating the takes of a pipeline merely
amount to regulation of the production of a given well,' especially in
situations where, as in the Hugoton field, gas is produced under contracts
that leave it to the purchaser to set the rate of production through its
1 52
decision on takes.
Because the purpose of the three different conservation measures
discussed in this note, regardless of to whom each is directed, is to regulate the physical act of taking gas from a reservoir, a more appropriate
method of examining such measures would be to evaluate the effect of the
order in light of the intent of the NGA and the NGPA.
The NGA was enacted to create a comprehensive federal scheme for
governing the transportation and rates of natural gas in interstate commerce,153 and the purpose of the NGPA was to allow market conditions,
54
rather than artificial price ceilings, to control the price of natural gas.'
Conversely, then, the NGA and the NGPA prevent states from directly
150. Northern Natural,372 U.S. at 100 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
151. Id. Initially, the FPC interpreted § 717(b) as applying only to sales at the downstream end
of interstate pipelines and not to sales by producers to pipelines. Transco, 474 U.S. at 430 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951) and Natural Gas Pipeline
Co., 2 F.P.C. 218 (1940). In 1954, the Court gave § 717(b) a broader reading to extend the NGA
coverage to both downstream and local sales. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347
U.S. 672 (1954)).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
153. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1275 (citation omitted).
154. Transco, 474 U.S. at 431 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
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regulating the wholesale prices of gas sold in interstate commerce. Yet
federal authority does not exist to the exclusion of state authority, and
the Court has now recognized that jurisdictional tensions in the context
of regulating producers do not instantly give rise to preemption. 5' Thus,
one is justified in asking what effect the Northwest Central order would
have if it were directed at purchasers rather than producers. The answer
is, of course, that the order would have had the same impact as the order
directed at producers has. Thus, becuase the production of natural gas
and its transportation into interstate commerce are inseparable physical
acts, a conservation measure that has as its goal protecting correlative
rights and preventing waste, with no intent to regulate the price of interstate sales of natural gas, should be allowed even if it is directed at the
purchaser.1 5 6 The focus of inquiry should be, irrespective of to whom the
action is directed, whether the state action is a legitimate conservation
attempt. The same general principle, albeit from a more learned and experienced perspective, has recently been proposed and is worthy of brief
15 7
discussion.
C. Section 11 of the NGA
It has been suggested that section l(b) of the NGA1 58 has been misapplied in the battle to conserve natural gas and to protect correlative
rights, while the portion of the NGA more appropriately designed to
address conversation matters, section 11,159 has been ignored.160 It is
Professor David E. Pierce's contention that section l(b) was intended to
address only the jurisdictional authority over pricing and transportation
155. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
156. This of course presumes that the conservation measure is truly such and is not a veiled
attempt to manipulate the purchasing practices of pipelines. At this point it is important to note that
neither regulation of producers not purchasers is as effective at addressing correltive rights issues as
is unitization of a field. Unitization is the joint operation of all or a portion of a producing reservoir
where the owners designate one party as the unit operator and production of the reservoir is shared
in accordance with each owners correlative rights. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supranote 46,
at 938; and Pierce, State Regulation of NaturalGas in a FederallyDeregulatedMarket: The Tragedy
of the Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 15, 23-26 (1987).
157. See Pierce, Reconciling State Oil and Gas Conservation Regulation with the Natural Gas Act:
New Statutory Revelations, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 9.
158. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982).
159. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717(j) (1982). The section reads:
In case two or more States propose to the Congress compacts dealing with conservation, production, transportation, or distribution of natural gas it shall be the duty of the
Commission to assemble pertinent information relative to the matters covered in any such
proposed compact, to make public and to report to the Congress information so obtained,
together with such recommendations for further legislation as may appear to be appropriate or necessary to carry out the purposes of such proposed compact and to aid in the
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while section 11 demarcates jurisdictional authority

over conservation issues. 62 This interpretation is especially interesting
in that section 11 appears on its surface to be nothing more than an invitation to the states to propose compacts to Congress in order to promote
their conservation efforts. 16 3 Furthermore, section 11 contains no grant
of jurisdictional authority." 6

Pierce's thesis, however, is derived from examination of the legislative history and consideration of the state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence when Congress was constructing the NGA. 6 1 At the time the
NGA was being put together,166 the United States Supreme Court read
the Commerce Clause as allowing the states jurisdiction over such activities as mining and manufacturing. 67 It is especially pertinent that the
Court also considered the production of oil, like coal, to be "'essentially
a mining operation and therefore . . . not part of interstate commerce
even though the product obtained is intended to be and in fact is immedi-

ately shipped in such commerce.' ""6 Clearly, then, just prior to the
1938 enactment of the NGA, production was not subject to Commerce
Clause scrutiny, as it was considered to be "a step in preparation for
commerce," rather than commerce itself.'6 9 Furthermore, during the
NGA deliberations investigating conservation issues, Congress utilized

reports by both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the House
conservation of natural-gas resources within the United States and in the orderly, equitable, and economic production, transportation, and distribution of natural gas.
It shall be the duty of the Commission to assemble and keep current pertinent information relative to the effect and operation of any compact between two or more States
heretofore or hereafter approved by the Congress, to make such information public, and to
report to the Congress, from time to time, the information so obtained, together with such
recommendations as may appear to be appropriate or necessary to promote the purposes of
such compact.
In carrying out the purpose of this chapter, the Commission shall, so far as practicable, avail itself of the services, records, reports, and information of the executive departments and other agencies of the Government, and the President may, from time to time,
direct that such services and facilities be made available to the Commission.
Id.
160. Pierce, supra note 157, at 11.
161. Pierce, supra note 157, at 41.
162. Pierce, supra note 157, at 32-35.
163. See supra note 159.
164. See supra note 159.
165. Pierce, supra note 157, at 35-41.
166. The pertinent time being the late 1920's through the late 1930's. Pierce supra note 157, at
32 n.129.
167. Pierce supra note 157, at 36-37.
168. Pierce, supra note 157, at 37 (citing Carter v. Carter Coal, Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936),
(quoting Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932)).
169. Pierce supra note 157, at 37 (citing Carter v. Carter Coal, Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936),
(quoting Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932)).
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Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 170 Both reports
recommended that producing states take appropriate measures to prevent waste and to protect correlative rights.' 7 t The FTC report further
recommended that because production was not regarded as1 72commerce,
conservation matters should be left to the producing states.
Based on the foregoing discussion, Pierce contends that any preemption analysis should begin by examining those state conservation measures that were accepted and promoted by Congress when it enacted the
NGA. 173 Furthermore, under section 11 analysis, whether a pipeline's
purchasing practices are influenced by a state regulation is of no importance. 174 For the legislative history of section 11 indicates that Congress'
only concern with state regulatory actions was whether the regulation
violated the Commerce Clause, not whether purchasing decisions could
be affected. 175 Therefore, when the issue is whether an alleged conservation regulation is valid, one simply has to examine the types of conservation measures accepted by Congress when the NGA was enacted. 176 Not
surprisingly, prorationing and ratable take regulations were among the
conservation measures then employed. 177
Section 11 analysis, therefore, leads to the same conclusion that is
reached if the rigid "producer v. purchaser" test of section l(b) is abandoned. 1 78 That is, under both section l(b) and section 11, the issue
would be whether the state regulation involves a conservation matter.
Therefore, ratable take orders, such as those at issue in Northern Natural 179 and Transco, 80 examined in either suggested manner, are not preempted by the NGA and are otherwise valid as long as there are no
Commerce Clause or other constitutional conflicts.' 8s '
170. Pierce supra note 157, at 32-33 (citing Utility Corporations,Final Report Federal Trade
Comm'n Pursuant to S.J. Res. No. 83, S.Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A (1936) [hereinafter FTC Report] and Report on Pipelines, H.R. Rep. No. 2192, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
LXXVIII-LXXIX (1933) [hereinafter House Report]).
171. Pierce, supra note 157, at 33.
172. Pierce, supra note 157, at 37-42.
173. Pierce, supra note 157, at 37-42.
174. Pierce, supra note 157, at 37-42.
175. Pierce, supra note 157, at 37-42.
176. Pierce, supra note 157, at 42.
177. Pierce, supra note 157, at 42-43 (citing FTC Report, supra note 170, pt. 84-A, at 104).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 150-57.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 45-63.
180. See supra text accompanying note* 64-113.
181. Northern Natural was decided solely on the issue of preemption. Northern Natural, 372
U.S. 84, 86 (1963). The Transco majority, because it found the Mississippi order to be preempted,
did not address whether the order violated the Commerce Clause. Transco, 474 U.S. 409, 425
(1986). Justice Rehnquist, in finding no Commerce Clause violation stated: "the statute regulates
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The KCC order governing the timing of production at issue in
Northwest Central18 2 passes section 11 scrutiny.' 8 3 As has been stated,
the issue is simply whether the order is a conservation measure. If it is,
the Constitution, rather than the NGA or the NGPA, serves as the standard by which the order is measured.18 4 Although the Supreme Court
used section l(b) analysis, it found the order to be a valid conservation
regulation and well within the bounds of the Constitution's Commerce
Clause limitations.' 8 5 Even though the KCC prorationing order is valid
under both section 1(b) and section 11 analysis, the latter is preferable; if
it had been directed at "purchasers,"'18 6 with no greater impact than
when directed at "producers," Northern Natural/Transcoanalysis would
87
preempt the order.1
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although Northwest Centralputs to rest the fear that the Supreme
Court would strike any state production regulation that might impact
purchasing decisions, still unsettling is the idea that the Court approaches the issue of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights
from its rigid producer/purchaser point of view. However, of some import, since Transco was decided in 1986, there has been a change in the
complexion of the Court - Chief Justice Burger, who joined the fivejustice majority opinion, and Justice Powell, who joined the dissent have retired. Thus, with their replacements - Justices Scalia and Kennedy - seemingly tilting the Court to a more conservative course, it is
not inconceivable that, had push come to shove, Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Transco might now command a majority of the Court.
Nonetheless, with environmental concerns over such problems as
acid rain and urban smog steadily growing, and no immediate prospects
of the nuclear power industry overcoming its negative image, the demand
for cleaner burning natural gas will undoubtedly increase. The Court
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest - the interest in both fair dealing on the
part of joint owners and conservation - and its effects on interstate commerce are incidental at
most." Transco, 474 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 114-39.
183. See Pierce, supra note 157, at 51-52.
184. See Pierce, supra note 157, at 51-52.
185. Northwest Central, 109 S. Ct. at 1278, 1280-82.
186. The cynic may conclude, quite understandably, that "purchasers" were precisely the target
of the order, i.e., "take the gas according to this timetable or lose your right to take it at all."
187. See Pierce, supra note 157, at 52.
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should move beyond the strict, illogical Northern Natural/Transcoanalysis and return to the states the authority to regulate the takes of purchasers, particularly when the purchasing decisions of interstate pipelines
cause waste and correlative rights violations. Returning such authority
to the producing states, can be accomplished through both the modified
section 1(b) analysis and section 11 analysis.
Kevin M. Pybas
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